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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), by order dated June 14, 2001. R. at 1188. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the five-minute 
rebuttal testimony of Mr. Cottle, and whether the district court abused its 
discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on this issue? 
b. Whether the district court abused its discretion in the manner in which it 
handled the issue of Defendant's whereabouts? 
c. Whether the court abused its discretion by excusing Juror Tarns for cause? 
d. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the expert 
testimony of Dr. David Rollins? 
e. Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Jex to 
testify regarding Merryweather's September 2000 demotion, and whether 
the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a 
new trial on this issue? 
f. Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing (largely without 
objection) certain statements by counsel that Defendant now claims are 
"prejudicial," whether the district court abused its discretion by denying 
Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on one of these alleged 
"prejudicial" statements, and whether the district court abused its discretion 
by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on this issue? 
g. Whether, if the district court committed error, any such error was harmless? 
This Court reviews all of these issues for an abuse of discretion. Several of these issues 
(a, e, and f) arose in the context of Defendant's motion for new trial; "[ojrders granting or 
denying motions for a new trial will not be reversed . . . unless there has been a manifest 
abuse of discretion." See Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 
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(Utah 1981). Several of these issues (a, b, d, and e) involve the district court's decisions 
to admit or exclude evidence; "the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." See Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 
P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. Inc., 781 
P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude expert testimony "will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion"). One of these issues (issue c) involves the district court's decision to excuse 
a potential juror for cause; "a trial court's determination of whether to excuse a 
prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." See 
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, Tf25, 24 P.3d 948. One of these issues (issue f) involves the 
district court's decision to deny Defendant's motion for a mistrial; "[a] trial court's denial 
of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion" because "the 
trial court is in the best position to determine whether the incident prejudiced the jury." 
See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^[45, 28 P.3d 1278. Even Defendant agrees that all 
of these issues are to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Aplt's Br., at 1-3. 
Defendant neglects to mention, however, that several of the issues he raises on 
appeal were not properly preserved, through objection, during the trial. See infra pages 
10, 23 n.13, 24 n.14, 32, 42-48. Where a party does not object to the admission of evi-
dence, an appellate court may review the trial court's decision to admit the evidence, but 
only under the "plain error" standard. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d). "In order for an error to 
be 'plain,' an appellate court must find that it should have been obvious to the trial court 
that it was committing error." See State v. Elm. 808 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, Defendant also fails to mention that, even if the trial court did somehow 
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abuse its discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence, such an error is not revers-
ible "unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Utah R. Evid. 103(a); see Jones 
v. Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) (stating that "an erroneous 
decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error 
is harmful"). An error is "harmful" when "the likelihood of a different outcome in the 
absence of the error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. 
In this case, even if the district court committed error in its evidentiary rulings (which it 
did not), any such error was harmless—there is nothing to suggest that the jury's verdict 
would have been any different had more of the evidentiary rulings gone Defendant's way. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 is applicable to one of the issues in this appeal, and is 
set forth, in relevant part, at page 21. Merryweather is unaware of any other constitution-
al provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that are determinative in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The complaint in this case was filed in First District Court in Brigham City on 
June 8, 1998. See R. at 1. An Amended Complaint was filed ten days later. Id. at 6. 
The Complaint arose out of an automobile accident that occurred on February 28, 1997, 
wherein Defendant rear-ended Merryweather's vehicle, causing severe injuries to Merry-
weather. Id. at 6-8. After the completion of discovery, the case went to trial before 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield on September 20, 2000. See id. at 840 (trial transcript).1 The trial 
lasted for eight days, and concluded on October 3, 2000. Vol. 8. That day, after several 
The first page of the trial transcript is marked as page 840 of the court record. Herein, 
however, transcript pages will be cited by volume and page number (e.g., Vol. 2, at 10). 
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hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for Merryweather, awarding $1,300,568 
in damages. R. at 705-06. On October 20, 2000, the verdict was entered as a judgment. 
Id. at 711-12. On November 2, 2000, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial. Id. at 
716. On December 27, 2000, after the Motion for New Trial had been fully briefed, the 
district court ordered supplemental briefing on certain issues related to the motion. Id. at 
837. On March 7, 2001, after receiving the supplemental briefs and after hearing oral ar-
gument, the district court, after a diligent "search[]" for grounds to grant the motion, con-
cluded that there were none, and denied the motion. Id. at 1138. On March 27, 2001, the 
district court signed an order denying the motion for new trial. Id. at 1140-41. On April 
17, 2001, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. Id. at 1154. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Summary of Merryweather's Case-in-Chief, and the Evidence 
Presented at Trial 
At the time of the accident (February 1997), Rhonda Merryweather was a 35-year-
old wife and mother of three, and was employed as a registered nurse on staff at the Bear 
River Valley Hospital ("BRVH") in Tremonton, Utah. At that point in her life, she was 
in excellent health—she had just delivered a son in 1996, was fully functional at home 
and at work, and regularly participated in various recreational activities, including regular 
strenuous exercise. All of this changed on February 28, 1997 as she was driving home. 
Defendant was home in Tremonton from Snow College to visit family and friends 
on February 28, 1997. That afternoon, he was driving a Honda. See Vol. 2, at 9. 
Defendant testified that, at the time of the accident, he was traveling 20-25 mph in a 40-
mph speed zone. Id. at 18. At this point, Defendant looked down to the seat next to him 
at a piece of paper. Id. at 25. As he looked up, he saw that Merryweather's Ford 
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Explorer was only 2-3 car lengths directly in front of him. Id. at 24. She was stopped in 
traffic waiting for a truck to turn left. Defendant does not have a memory of being able 
to brake or slow or steer his vehicle prior to impact. Id. at 20, 28. Defendant's Honda 
struck Merryweather's Explorer from the rear, and nose-dived under the SUV—the two 
vehicles remained stuck together following the crash. Id. at 30. The SUV had to be 
physically lifted off of the Honda by the wrecking truck. Id. at 40, 57, 66. After impact, 
the SUV was pushed forward 15-20 feet, and was pushed partially into the opposite lane 
of traffic. Vol. 3, at 39, 41-42. Rudolph Limpert, Ph.D. ("Dr. Limpert"), a mechanical 
engineer who reconstructed the facts of the collision, testified that Defendant's vehicle 
was traveling approximately 30 mph, did not slow prior to collision, and basically agreed 
with the version of the collision as testified to by Defendant. Id. at 66-67. He also 
testified to the significant speed and forces on Merryweather's body and neck. Id. at 74. 
At the scene of the accident, Merryweather told the investigating officer, as well 
as Defendant and his parents, that she was injured. Vol. 2, at 79; Vol. 6, at 32-33. 
Immediately after the accident, her husband took her to see their family physician, Chad 
Merrell, M.D. ("Dr. Merrell"), at the local clinic adjacent to BRVH. Vol. 2, at 81-82; 
Vol. 6, at 33-34. She was diagnosed with a neck injury and referred to physical therapy. 
Vol. 2, at 82-83; Vol. 4, at 198-203; Vol. 6, at 34. During the time between the accident 
and October 17, 1997, Merryweather received medical care and treatment from Dr. 
Merrell, Jay Cottle, RPT ("Mr. Cottle"), and Teresa Frandsen ("Ms. Frandsen"), a 
physical therapy aide at BRVH. Vol. 2, at 89. Some of the visits to these medical 
professionals were formal and documented; however, many of the visits were informal 
"curbside" visits between co-medical workers and were undocumented. E.g., id. at 149, 
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160, 163. Each of the medical witnesses testified that all of the formal and informal visits 
and treatments did in fact take place. For instance, Ms. Frandsen testified that there were 
as many as 10 physical therapy treatments in this time frame. Id. at 185. 
On October 17, 1997, Merryweather awoke with excruciating pain, which was 
treated at home and at the clinic. Id. at 95-96. On October 22, 1997, Merryweather was 
admitted to BRVH, and, subsequently, transferred to McKay-Dee Hospital in Ogden, 
where she came under the care of Bryson Smith, M.D. ("Dr. Smith"), a neurosurgeon. Id. 
at 105-06; Vol. 4, at 145, 153. Following treatment in Ogden, she was ultimately referred 
to the Pain Clinic at the University of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City, and came 
under the direct care of Michael Ashburn, M.D. ("Dr. Ashburn"), an anesthesiologist 
specializing in pain management. See Vol. 4, at 6, 46. At the time of trial, Merryweather 
was under the continuing care of Dr. Ashburn and the Pain Clinic staff. Id. at 46. 
At trial, Merryweather presented testimony from each of these medical care provi-
ders and physicians. Each of the physicians testified, based upon reasonable medical prob-
abilities, that Merryweather's initial injury and its progression over time were caused by 
the collision. Vol. 4, at 79 (Dr. Ashburn); id. at 172 (Dr. Smith); id. at 217 (Dr. Merrell). 
Merryweather presented evidence supporting her claim for future special damages 
using a combination of three expert witnesses. Dr. Ashburn first testified concerning the 
opinions he gave to David Rollins, Ph.D. ("Dr. Rollins"), a life care planner and vocational 
rehabilitationist. Using Dr. Rollins' report (which he helped prepare), Dr. Ashburn test-
ified as to each of the report's specific categories of necessary future medical and non-
medical care and treatment. Vol. 4, at 84-91, 94-98. In each instance, Dr. Ashburn (the 
medical doctor) testified that each category and each item was necessary based upon 
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reasonable medical probabilities. Id. Dr. Ashbum also testified that the wage loss portion 
of Dr. Rollins' report was also based upon reasonable medical probabilities. Id. at 94-98. 
This testimony from Dr. Ashbum came into evidence without objection from Defendant. 
Following Dr. Ashbum, Dr. Rollins testified to the same opinions as had Dr. Ash-
bum; all of his testimony was based upon reasonable rehabilitative probabilities. Vol. 5, at 
100-01. Dr. Rollins is board certified in three separate areas of forensic medical/legal 
areas, id. at 77, and has been qualified to testify in numerous courts in Utah and many other 
states, id. at 77-78. He testified that he had met with Merryweather and with Dr. Ashbum, 
and, in addition, had visited BRVH and had met with Merryweather's supervisor concern-
ing her ongoing employment. Id. at 82-86. Dr. Rollins placed year 1999 dollar amounts 
on each of the items outlined in his report and testified to by Dr. Ashbum. Id. at 98. 
Finally, Merryweather presented the testimony and expert economic opinions of 
Paul Randle, Ph.D. ("Dr. Randle"). Dr. Randle had followed accepted economic principles 
and legal requirements in reducing all damages, including the future special damages, to 
their present value. Id. at 200. Dr. Randle's opinions reflected future medical damages 
and past and future lost wage damages in excess of $1,200,000. The jury ultimately 
awarded $968,568 in special damages and $332,000 in general damages, for a total verdict 
of $1,300,568—significantly less than what Merryweather requested in closing argument. 
After reviewing the evidence presented at trial in connection with Defendant's post-
trial motion, the district court stated that "[d]espite repeated efforts to find a good reason to 
grant a new trial, the court in every instance comes back to the fundamental issue: there 
was evidence presented to the jury that supports the verdict" R. at 1137 (emph. added). 
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B, Pre-Trial Motions and Developments 
1. Merryweather's motion in limine. 
In advance of trial, Merryweather filed several pretrial motions in limine, one of 
which merits mention here. On August 7, 2000, Merryweather filed a motion in limine to 
exclude any expert testimony at variance with the expert testimony offered in the 
respective defense experts' depositions. Id. at 271. During the discovery process, it 
became clear that defense counsel had decided not to provide certain materials to 
Defendant's two liability and two medical experts. Specifically, defense counsel did not 
provide any of the depositions to any of the experts, and had only provided selected 
portions of the treating physicians' medical records to Defendant's medical experts.2 
The district court, after briefing and argument, granted Merryweather's motion in 
limine. Id. at 1175 (transcript of Sept. 7, 2000 hearing), at 15-26. The trial court 
specifically ruled that each of the defense experts would be allowed to testify, but only to 
the opinions and issues found in the depositions, and that the defense experts would only 
be allowed to rely on the materials provided to them at the time of their deposition. 
Defendant does not challenge the court's ruling on the motion in limine; it is 
mentioned here only because the issues are germane to some of the issues in this appeal. 
2. The dispute about Defendant's whereabouts and unavailability. 
The fact that Defendant was not going to be present at trial was initially discussed 
For instance, defense counsel elected not to provide Paul France, Ph.D. ("Dr. France"), 
a collison reconstruction expert, with Defendant's deposition, and hence Dr. France had 
not heard Defendant's version of speed, distance or braking. Vol. 7, at 140. Moreover, 
defense counsel elected not to provide Defendant's medical experts with any depositions 
of the health care providers (Dr. Ashburn, Dr. Smith, Dr. Merrell, Mr. Cottle) who 
testified concerning the formal and informal medical treatments given to Merryweather. 
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during the September 7 hearing on the motion in limine. At that hearing, Merryweather's 
counsel asked if Defendant would be present at trial and, if not, how the district court 
intended to deal with the issue of his LDS mission. Id. at 68. The Court noted that it was 
possibly prejudicial to tell the jury that Defendant was serving a mission, because "while 
they are on their mission they sort of achieve sainthood." Id. at 68, 70. 
Defense counsel requested that he be able to tell the jury of Defendant's where-
abouts "so they don't think he's in jail." Id. at 69. Later in the same hearing, the Court 
made a ruling that the jury will be told that "the defendant is overseas. He's presently un-
available. And both sides have agreed to use his deposition rather than to wait until he 
returns." Id. at 89. The court also noted that "[i]f either of you wranted to wait until he 
returns you would have objected to this trial setting." Id. at 89. The court reiterated that 
"both sides have agreed to use his deposition and to go forward with the trial rather than 
wait for him to return." Id. at 90-91. Defense counsel responded: "Okay." Id. at 91. 
Three weeks later, on the first day of trial, these issues came up during the jury se-
lection prbcess. The court restated its ruling of September 7, and noted that the ruling 
was given with defense counsel present, and although defense counsel had lodged an ob-
jection to the court's decision not to tell the jury that Defendant was on a mission, there 
had been no objection to the trial setting and no continuance had been requested. Vol. 1, 
at 30-31. Despite this, defense counsel made a motion for a continuance on the first day 
of trial, which motion was denied. Id. at 32. Later that day, after the jury had been im-
paneled, the court did inform the jury as to Defendant's whereabouts in a manner con-
sistent with his ruling, and instructed the jury that Defendant's whereabouts would there-
fore not be an issue. Id. at 56-57 (Defendant "is overseas" and "presently not available"). 
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Later in the trial, before closing arguments, defense counsel again raised this issue. 
See R. at 841 (transcript of October 2, 2000 hearing), at 20-26. At the conclusion of the 
discussion, the court decided to relax its prior ruling, and allow defense counsel to state, 
one time, that Defendant is "serving his church in Brazil." Id. at 23. Following the 
court's ruling, and in his initial closing argument to the jury, defense counsel stated: 
I didn't want you to think that he's a fugitive from justice or in a Turkish 
prison somewhere. Quite simply, Carson is serving his church overseas in 
Brazil and doesn't come back until later this year. That's the only reason 
he's not here at trial . . . . Now, we were prepared to proceed without him 
because his presence really wasn't necessary. 
Vol. 8, at 44. 
Before closing argument, the district court also granted Merryweather's request to 
comment on the connection between (a) Defendant's absence from the trial and (b) the 
fact that Defendant's version of the collision, as read to the jury through his deposition, 
was flatly contradicted by the defense's two accident reconstruction experts. See R. at 
841 (transcript of October 2, 2000 hearing), at 5-26.3 At the time of this ruling, defense 
counsel did not make an objection.4 Based on this ruling, Merryweather's counsel began 
his closing rebuttal argument by pointing out that "there's a reason why [defense counsel] 
chose to try this case with his client overseas," and suggesting that this reason had 
3
 At trial, Newell Knight, one of Defendant's accident reconstruction experts, testified 
that it was "absolutely" true that his testimony was "inconsistent" with Defendant's 
testimony, and confirmed that, at his deposition, he testified that Defendant was 
"absolutely wrong" about the collision. Vol. 6, at 192. In opening statement, defense 
counsel characterized this collision as a "low speed rear end accident." Vol. 1, at 180. 
Indeed, in his brief, Defendant continues to maintain, contrary to Defendant's own 
testimony, that "the case presented a low speed accident." See Aplt's Br., at 4. 
4
 See footnote 13, infra. 
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everything to do with the disagreement between Defendant, on the one hand, and his 
counsel and experts, on the other hand, with respect to the speed and the events of the 
collision. Vol. 8, at 84. Once again, defense counsel did not make any objection at the 
time of the discussion of the above noted association. 
3. Merryweather's employment status. 
In the months leading up to the trial, Merryweather's employment status changed 
twice. The distinction between these two changes in her employment status is critical. 
Following the collision in February 1997, Merryweather continued to work full 
time as a staff nurse until October 1997, and following the multiple hospitalizations of 
October and November 1997, Merryweather did not begin to return to work until the 
spring of 1998. Vol. 5, at 173-81. At trial, both Merryweather and Robert Jex ("Mr. 
Jex"), the hospital administrator, outlined Merryweather's employment at IHC following 
the October 1997 hospitalization. Id. at 25-59; Vol. 6, at 15-17, 54. 
Due to physical limitations, Merryweather was not allowed to return to her pre-
vious job as a staff/floor nurse, but was given more ministerial, paperwork-style functions 
to perform. Vol. 5, at 36-37. She held this new administrative and ministerial position 
for approximately one year, from March 1998 to March 1999. Id. at 39-43. At Merry-
weather's depositions, which occurred on October 14 and November 12, 1998, defense 
counsel thoroughly explored the issues relating to Merryweather's inability to continue at 
her former job and her reassignment to an administrative job. See R. at 913-22. 
In March 1999, Merryweather was promoted to an administrative position as the 
The pleadings filed in this case reveal that Defendant, as well as Merryweather, 
designated Jex as a potential witness. Despite this fact, Defendant never took the 
opportunity to depose Jex (or any other supervisor or employment-related witness). 
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#3 administrator at BRVH. Her promotion took place after her two depositions were 
taken in the fall of 1998. Vol. 5, at 39-43. 
Change #1. In late 1999, however, Merryweather's supervisors began to notice 
that her job performance in this new administrative job was unsatisfactory. In November 
1999, Mr. Jex brought Merryweather in to discuss poor job performance in her new 
administrative position. After November 1999, he and the #2 administrator met with 
Merryweather every 3 or 4 months to discuss her poor job performance and her struggle 
to perform her administrative tasks. Id. at 43-44. Finally, in the summer of 2000, and at 
the request and direction of her physicians, Merryweather reduced her weekly hours from 
full time (40 hours) to 30-32 hours a week. Vol. 5, at 51; Vol. 6, at 60. 
Change #2. This change, however, did not completely alleviate Merryweather's 
employment problems. In September 2000, after several meetings and repeated attempts 
to encourage and train and help Merryweather, Mr. Jex made the decision to return her to 
floor/staff nursing and terminate her from her administrative position. Vol. 5, at 44. This 
new staff position was a low-impact nursing position dealing primarily with labor and 
delivery and the newborn nursery. Id. at 50-53. The district court clearly understood the 
distinction between these two separate employment changes. See R. at 1135. 
Neither of these changes should have come as any surprise. Dr. Ashburn was de-
posed on June 9, 1999. In his deposition, Dr. Ashburn explained in detail that Merry-
weather's efforts to return to work full-time were causing more pain and symptoms, and 
that any attempt to return to full-time work would likely end in failure. R. at 929-30. 
Further, he explained that her work schedule would need to be reduced to part-time to 
allow her to be productive and successful. Id. In addition, Dr. Ashburn explained to 
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defense counsel that "it's very likely [that Merryweather is] going to fail" in her attempt 
to return to full-time employment. Id. at 927. Dr. Ashburn's trial testimony was consis-
tent with his reports and opinions expressed at his deposition. See Vol. 4, at 66. 
The District Court's Rulings on Admission of These Changes. Merryweather's 
economic expert, Dr. Randle, completed his initial economic report in September 1999; 
this report assumed that Merryweather was still a staff nurse. That is, Dr. Randle's 
September 1999 report (trial Exhibit #25) did not take into account either Merryweather's 
1999 promotion from staff nurse to administrator (and concomitant increase in salary) or 
Merryweather's September 2000 demotion back to staff nurse. Upon learning of Merry-
weather's September demotion,6 counsel instructed Dr. Randle to prepare an updated 
economic analysis based on the recent changes to Merryweather's employment status. 
Dr. Randle produced a new report based on the new information; this report (trial 
Exhibit #25A) contained higher numbers regarding Merryweather's past and future lost 
wages.7 Merryweather presented defense counsel with a copy of this new report on 
September 26. Vol. 5, at 3-24. However, when Merryweather attempted to introduce the 
6
 Dr. Randle and Merryweather's counsel met with Jex during the afternoon of September 
25, 2000 (an off-day in the trial schedule) to prepare updated economic numbers and 
analysis. During this meeting, Jex disclosed to counsel that Merryweather no longer held 
the administrative position and had been reassigned to the low-impact staff nursing 
position. This was the first time that Merryweather's counsel learned of this second 
change in Merryweather's job status. R. at 804-13 (affidavit of Merryweather's counsel). 
"7 
The difference between Dr. Randle's original report and his new report was substantial. 
In the new report, which accounted for the promotion, Dr. Randle concluded that 
Merryweather's future wage losses were more than $290,000.00 greater than they had 
been under the prior calculations. Thus, the district court's decision to refuse admission 
of Exhibit #25A, based upon Defendant's objection, effectively prevented Merryweather 
from presenting evidence of an additional $290,000.00 in future lost wages. 
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new report during the trial, the Court, upon Defendant's objection, refused to allow it into 
evidence. The Court ruled that Dr. Randle would be restricted to using only the numbers 
prepared originally in his September 22, 1999 report (Exhibit #25). Id. at 17-19. 
Thus, the only economic evidence from Dr. Randle that went to the jury did not 
take into account: (a) Merryweather's 1999 "promotion" to administrator; or (b) her 
September 2000 "demotion" back to low-impact staff nurse. Rather, the only economic 
evidence that went to the jury was computed on the basis of Merryweather's original staff 
o 
nurse job with IHC and an anticipated reduction in hours worked. 
On the other hand, defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine Dr. Randle and 
Dr. Rollins on all of these topics. For instance, defense counsel was allowed to attempt 
to impeach the veracity of these witnesses (and their reports) on the basis of the March 
1999 promotion and the resulting increase in salary. Vol. 5, at 147, 216-17. In fact, 
Defendant placed into evidence Merryweather's W-2 forms reflecting her historical 
income and the promotion and the significant increase in pay, id. at 61, and used these 
documents to cross-examine Dr. Randle, id. at 216-17. 
C. Additional Trial Issues 
1. Dr. Knorpp's fabrications and Mr. Cottle's rebuttal testimony. 
Defendant called Scott Knorpp, M.D. ("Dr. Knorpp") as one of his expert witnesses 
at trial. Vol. 7, at 3. During Defendant's examination of Dr. Knorpp, Defendant offered 
a report into evidence that had been authored by Dr. Knorpp, and this report, with a 
8
 The district court did allow Dr. Randle to state that, based upon her promotion and later 
demotion, Merryweather's future lost wages/income would be "higher." Vol. 5, at 17-19, 
220. The court did not, however, permit the introduction of any numbers to substantiate 
or quantify this statement. 
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minor redaction, was admitted into evidence. Id. at 83. At the bottom of page 8 of Dr 
Knorpp's report, the following language appears: 
Given that this report was undated, / took the liberty of speaking with Mr. 
Cottle via telephone on January 18, 2000 to further review Mrs. 
Mprryweather's case. 
Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
On cross-examination, counsel questioned Dr. Knorpp about the telephone conver-
sation referenced in the report, and about the specific statements Dr. Knorpp made to Mr. 
Cottle. Id. at 42-59. Initially, Dr. Knorpp agreed that he had called Mr. Cottle to express 
his "displeasure" at the manner in which Ms. Frandsen had failed to document provided 
services. He agreed that he had expressed "several criticisms" on the subject of 
documentation, and that he told Mr. Cottle that he felt Mr. Cottle had committed 
"malpractice" in failing to document the treatments. Id. at 43-47. 
Dr. Knorpp testified that he couldn't recall if he told Mr. Cottle that he (Dr. 
Knorpp) didn't think that the undocumented therapy visits performed by Ms. Frandsen 
should be reflected in his prepared report. Dr. Knorpp did agree, after a review of his 
report (specifically pages 8-9), that the undocumented visits were in fact not included in 
his report, even though he had known about them. Id. at 49-51. 
Dr. Knorpp admitted that he understood the conversation between Mr. Cottle and 
him to be "confidential." Id. at 53. But he denied that he had expressed—in a second 
phone call with the therapist—that the two had some kind of "gentleman's agreement" 
that Dr. Knorpp would not include the undocumented visits in his report. Id. at 58. 
Further, Dr. Knorpp denied that he stated that he was doing Mr. Cottle a "favor" by not 
including the undocumented visits in his report, because Mr. Cottle would be 
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"barbecued" during his testimony at the trial over the undocumented visits. Id. at 58-59. 
Dr. Knorpp also denied that he told Mr. Cottle that he (Dr. Knorpp) would call both 
Mr. Cottle's "administrator" and "DOPL" (the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing) and report Mr. Cottle's conduct. Id. at 56. 
Following this litany of admissions and denials by Dr. Knorpp, Merryweather 
recalled Mr. Cottle as a rebuttal witness. The district court gave Merryweather only 5 
minutes to present Mr. Cottle's testimony regarding the two phone conversations. Id. at 
177. On the stand, Mr. Cottle described the conversations, and stated that he had brought 
with him to court a five-page, single-spaced handwritten summary of the conversations— 
notes that he had prepared on the day of the phone calls. Id. at 202-09. Mr. Cottle 
disagreed with Dr. Knorpp's recollection, and described to the jury the following 
particulars: the existence and the context of respective references by Dr. Knorpp to a 
"gentleman's agreement"; that Dr. Knorpp was doing Mr. Cottle a "favor" by not 
including the undocumented visits; the use of the term "barbecued" in reference to what 
would arguably happen to Mr. Cottle on the witness stand if he testified concerning the 
undocumented visits; and, finally, that Dr. Knorpp had indeed expressed to him that he 
was going to report Mr. Cottle to both his administrator and to DOPL. Id. at 202-05. 
2. The context of counsel's so-called "plea to poverty." 
Merryweather's counsel began his opening statement with a brief explanation of 
the basic elements of an injury case—negligence, causation and damages. After this brief 
introduction, Merryweather's counsel then set forth the chronological story of the case, 
including the collision and Merryweather's subsequent medical treatment. Vol. 1, at 134. 
At this point in the argument, Merryweather's counsel employed a metaphor, 
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stating that on the date of the accident, a "fire" was started—a fire of pain in 
Merryweather's body. Merryweather's counsel stated that Merryweather had made 
numerous attempts to squelch the fire by medical means, but that the doctors had told 
Merryweather that the fire could not be extinguished, and that she would need life-long 
care and treatment for her chronic pain condition. Id. at 140-52. 
In the context of this "fire" metaphor, counsel asked, rhetorically, "who pays for all 
of this pain medication" and other items. Id. at 153. The rhetorical answer to the 
rhetorical question, based on established principles of accountability and causation, was 
that the person "who started the fire" should be the person who should pay for the life-
long medical treatment and care. Id. at 153. Immediately, Merryweather's counsel 
turned to the poster paper chart of the elements of a claim and pointed out that Defendant 
should be responsible and accountable for the injury and associated costs caused by his 
own admitted negligence. At no time did counsel discuss Merryweather's own financial 
situation, or suggest that she would have been unable to pay for the medical care through 
other means. Notably, this discussion occurred prior to any reference to Dr. Randle's 
economic report concerning future medical damages. Id. at 153; id. at 167. 
At the conclusion of opening statements, Defendant first raised the issue of the so-
called "plea to poverty," and asked the district court to declare a mistrial. Id. at 169-70. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury, after sitting for eight days and hearing the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, rendered a verdict in favor of Merryweather. The district court, on Defendant's 
motion for new trial, indicated that it was not entirely in agreement with the verdict, and 
conducted a thorough search for grounds upon which to grant a new trial. It found none. 
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R. at 1137-38. The court stated that it "would not hesitate to grant a new trial if it could, 
in good conscience, say that there was a part of the verdict that did not have evidentiary 
support." Id. at 1138. However, "[djespite repeated efforts to find a good reason to grant 
a new trial, the court in every instance [came] back to the fundamental issue: there was 
evidence presented to the jury that supports the verdict." Id. at 1137. 
On appeal, Defendant raises several issues that he maintains constitute reversible 
error. Most of these issues were scrutinized by the trial court during the new trial motion; 
each of the issues raised by Defendant must be reviewed for abuse of discretion. As 
shown below, the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its evidentiary 
rulings, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. For these 
reasons, as discussed more fully below, the judgment of the district court should be 
affirmed, and the jury's verdict upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the district court, because the district 
court did not abuse its wide discretion in making the disputed rulings during the trial. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MR. COTTLE 
A. Mr. Cottle's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 608(c) 
The district court correctly determined that Mr. Cottle's rebuttal testimony was 
properly admitted under Utah R. Evid. 608(c), which states: "Bias, prejudice or any 
motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of 
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced'' Utah R. Evid. 608(c) (emphasis added); 
see also R. at 1136. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that this Rule "expressly allows 
extrinsic evidence of bias." See State v. Rammel 721 P.2d498, 500 n.l (Utah 1986). 
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At the hearing on Defendant's new trial motion, the district court asked defense 
counsel: "[I]sn't it certainly possible to argue that if Dr. Knorpp in fact had made the 
statements that were claimed, that that shows bias or prejudice on the part of the 
witness?" Defense counsel responded by stating: "Yes, I think that could be argued, 
four Honor." See Transcript from March 1, 2001 Hearing (excerpts of which are 
ittached hereto as Exhibit A), at 4. The district court, based on this admission, ruled that 
'Defendant admitted at the hearing in this matter that the rebuttal testimony may have 
>een proper 608(c) evidence of bias." R. at 1136. This alone is dispositive of 
Defendant's argument—defense counsel has admitted that Mr. Cottle's testimony is 
)roper under Rule 608(c). That should end the matter. 
In addition, the district court's determination—irrespective of any admission by 
lefense counsel—was correct. The actions of Dr. Knorpp (in calling other potential 
witnesses and trying to suborn perjury)9 certainly demonstrate his bias toward 
Defendant—the party paying him—and toward the medical diagnosis that would most 
benefit Defendant. From Dr. Knorpp's perspective, if he could orchestrate a way to 
effectually excise the undocumented physical therapy visits from the case, he could more 
easily reach the diagnosis that most benefited Defendant. That he took such dramatic 
steps toward accomplishing this goal shows his bias, and evidence of such bias may 
properly be introduced through extrinsic evidence pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 608(c). 
B. Mr. Cottle's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 608(b) 
M Cottle's rebuttal testimony was proper for another, wholly independent, 
9
 The ironic aspect of Dr. Knorpp's actions is that he was conspiring to hide evidence that 
was already in the record (through Mr. Cottle's and Ms. Frandsen's deposition testimony) 
but which had not been provided to him by defense counsel. 
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reasons-it is proper rebuttal evidence of a non-collateral matter. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that Rule 608(b) is concerned about "collateral issues" only. See State v. 
Hackfotd, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987). The Hagkford Court also stated that Utah's 
evidentiary rules in this context (Rules 607-610) are very similar to the federal rules and 
that courts may look to the federal rules for interpretive guidance. Id. 
Federal courts have been very clear about applying the collateral matter rule. That 
is, under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), extrinsic evidence is admissible for impeachment 
purposes, as long as the evidence used to impeach does not concern a collateral matter. 
See, e ^ , Palmer v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1507 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting "the 
general rule barring the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on a collateral 
matter through contradiction," and stating that "the purpose of Rule 608(b)'s prohibition 
of extritisic evidence is to avoid holding mini-trials on irrelevant or collateral matters"); 
see generally 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 607.06, at 607-72 to 607-84 (2000). 
The evidence regarding the telephone conversations between Dr. Knorpp and Mr. 
Cottle cannot possibly be a collateral matter. "The general test of whether evidence is 
collateral is whether the contradictory fact could have been shown for any purpose 
independently of the contradiction." See 4 WeinstehVs; supra, at § 607.06[3][a]. Thus, 
the content of the telephone conversations is a collateral matter only if the content of the 
telephone conversations cannot come into evidence for any purpose other than to show 
that Dr. Knorpp is lying. This is clearly not the case here. The content of the telephone 
conversations is relevant to the veracity of the conclusions Dr. Knorpp's draws in his 
report (^s well as Dr. Knorpp's bias, as shown above). It is relevant and admissible to 
show more than merely the fact that Dr. Knorpp lied; it is admissible to show, inter alia, 
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that Dr. Knorpp failed to include certain critical visits in his report, that Dr. Knorpp's 
report is based on faulty assumptions, and that Dr. Knorpp was biased, irrespective of any 
lies Dr. Knorpp may or may not have told while on the witness stand. Because the 
content of the telephone conversations is admissible to show more than the fact that Dr. 
Knorpp lied, the content of the conversations is not a collateral matter. Therefore, the 
rebuttal evidence is admissible under Rule 608(b). 
C. Rebuttal Testimony Has Been Allowed by Utah Courts 
In addition, the district court's decision to allow Mr. Cottle's brief rebuttal 
testimony is entirely in keeping with Utah practice. For instance, in a case applying Rule 
608(b), this Court stated that a party, in addition to cross-examination, "may also intro-
duce on rebuttal any evidence which would tend to contradict, explain, or cast doubt upon 
the credibility" of a witness. See State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Moreover, the Utah Legislature has pronounced that 
in every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by the 
manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by 
evidence affecting his character for truth, honesty, or integrity, or by his 
motives, or by contradictory evidence, and the jury are the exclusive judges 
of his credibility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (emphasis added).10 
In Utah, "evidence should not be excluded from rebuttal merely because it could 
have been made part of the case-in-chief," and if courts are concerned about a plaintiffs 
ability to "sandwich" the defense through rebuttal, "surrebuttal, rather than the exclusion 
of competent and proper rebuttal evidence, is the proper remedy." Astill v. Clark, 956 
10
 It is well settled that "constitutional requirements will trump a conflicting statute, just 
as a statute will trump a conflicting rule." See, e^g., In re Hudson, 260 B.R. 421, 444 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (citing Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)). 
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P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).11 In this case, defense counsel declined the 
opportunity for surrebuttal. See Vol. 7, at 209. 
D. In Any Event, Defendant Introduced Evidence of the Telephone 
Conversations 
Finally, Defendant's argument fails for yet another fundamental reason: 
Defendant is the one who introduced the evidence of the telephone conversations 
between Dr. Knorpp and Mr. Cottle. This evidence was included in Dr. Knorpp's report, 
which was introduced into evidence by Defendant. See Vol. 7, at 83. Thus, Defendant's 
entire argument (that rebuttal testimony is improper to rebut evidence first elicited on 
cross) fails for the simple reason that this evidence was not first introduced on cross; 
rather, it was introduced during Defendant's case-in-chief. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
MANNER IN WHICH IT HANDLED THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S 
WHEREABOUTS 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it handled the 
11
 Defendant cites Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 
U.S. 926 (2000), in support of his argument that rebuttal is only proper to rebut matters 
introduced on direct examination by the other party. Koch is of little assistance to 
Defendant. First, much of Koch's holding on the subject of rebuttal testimony is directly 
at odds with Utah law on the same topic, as set forth in Astill, Reed, and 78-24-1. 
Second, even assuming that the holding in Koch has application here, the court's holding 
was extremely narrow. The court held only that the trial court did not abuse its wide 
discretion in disallowing rebuttal evidence—certainly, Koch cannot be read to support the 
contention that a court making the opposite decision, and allowing the evidence, would 
have abused its discretion. For these reasons, Koch does not advance Defendant's cause. 
12
 Defendant's citation to Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), is entirely 
unhelpful The "reasonable anticipated test" that Defendant urges on this Court only 
applies where the potential rebuttal witness was undisclosed to the other party. See 
Turner, 872 P.2d at 1023; see also Astill, 956 P.2d at 1085. In this case, Merryweather 
listed Mr. Cottle as a potential witness in her witness designations, see R. at 111-12, and 
Defendant actually deposed Mr. Cottle, id- at 109. Turner simply does not apply here. 
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issue of Defendant's whereabouts. As explained above, at pages 8-11, defense counsel 
desired, from the beginning of trial, to tell the jury that Defendant was on an LDS 
mission in Brazil. The court did not allow this at that time; rather, the court told the jury 
that Defendant was "overseas" and "unavailable." However, in response to defense 
counsel's continued protestations, the court finally relented and allowed defense counsel, 
during closing argument, to tell the jury that Defendant was "serving his church in Bra-
zil." Concomitantly, however, the district court also allowed Merryweather to argue that 
Defendant was absent because his version of events did not square with the version of 
events postulated by the defense's experts or defense counsel.13 Defendant now argues 
that the court abused its discretion in handling this issue in such a manner. 
First, Defendant's argument is fundamentally flawed. Defendant argues that "a 
new trial is warranted upon the failure of the trial court to tell the jury exactly where the 
defendant was" and that "[njot allowing the jury to know where the defendant was 
prejudiced the defendant." Aplt's Br. at 26-27 (emphasis added). These statements are 
highly misleading. The district court did allow defense counsel to tell the jury where 
Defendant argues that the district court's decision to allow Merryweather to comment 
on this possible reason for Defendant's absence was improper. This argument must fail, 
however, because defense counsel never objected to those comments. In fact, 
Merryweather's counsel obtained the court's permission ahead of time to make that 
association, see R. at 841 (Transcript of October 2, 2000 hearing), at 25, and defense 
counsel did not object even then, id. All defense counsel said was that "if [Merry-
weather's counsel] makes that argument, . . . I have to then respond to that" and "the only 
way to do it is to discuss exactly where [Defendant] is and what he's doing." Id. In other 
words, defense counsel's only objection was that if Merryweather could point out that 
association, then defense counsel should get to tell the jury where Defendant was. As 
discussed herein, defense counsel got his wish—he was allowed to tell the jury where 
Defendant was. Thus, he got what he wanted, and did not make any further objection to 
Merryweather's submission regarding the possible reason for Defendant's absence. See 
Vol. 8, at 84. The district court's decision to allow the argument was not plain error. 
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Defendant was—that Defendant was "serving his church in Brazil." Vol. 8, at 44. 
Apparently, then, Defendant's argument is that the district court abused its 
discretion by declining to inform the jury, at the beginning of trial instead of at the end, 
that Defendant was on an LDS mission, and that this decision was so prejudicial as to 
change the outcome of the trial. This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. After being 
told, at the outset, that Defendant (a college-aged male from a largely LDS community) 
was "overseas" and "unavailable," the jury almost certainly figured out where Defendant 
was. In any event, in making its determination, the district court weighed the potential 
prejudice to each side, and, within its discretion, chose a course of action that it perceived 
to be a middle ground addressing the stated concerns of both sides.14 See R. at 841 
(Transcript of October 2, 2000 hearing), at 24. Such action is not an abuse of discretion; 
rather, it is the epitome of a considered and careful exercise of discretion. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCUSING JUROR TAMS FOR CAUSE 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing Juror Tarns for cause.15 
The district court, based on answers Juror Tarns gave to questions posed by the court and 
Defendant also argues that it was prejudiced because, while defense counsel did not get 
the tell the jury, at the beginning, where Defendant was, Merryweather got to allude to 
"church" softball games and the like. See Aplt's Br., at 27-28. This argument fails for 
the simple reason that Defendant did not object to any—not a single one—of the 
allusions to Merryweather's participation in "church" activities. See Vol. 2, at 46-47; 
Vol. 6, at 18, 68, 117. Thus, the district court's admission of such statements is reviewed 
under the plain error standard. Utah R. Evid. 103(d). Clearly, the district court's 
decision to allow these statements, without objection, was not obvious and plain error. 
15
 Defendant asserts that "[t]he total inquiry regarding Mr. Tarns is reproduced in 
Addendum C." Aplt's Br., at 47. This assertion is only partially true. The full story 
begins on page 70 of Volume 1, and continues on pages 83 and 87, before picking up 
again on page 97. See Vol. 1. Defendant's "total inquiry" omits the earlier pages. 
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counsel, had ample grounds for excusing Juror Tarns. 
A reading of the entire jury selection process in this case reveals that the court and 
counsel asked several questions designed to elicit a response from the jurors regarding 
their individual ability to be impartial. See Vol. 1, at 44-121. Where a concern was 
uncovered, the district court would ask the juror raising the concern a variation of the 
following question: "Do you feel that you could be fair and impartial?" E.g., id. at 62. 
In each instance in which the juror gave anything other than an unqualified "yes," the 
district court asked additional questions to ascertain the basis for the juror's concern, and 
then, if the concern was not cleared up, excused the juror for cause. The district court 
excused seven jurors (other than Juror Tarns) for this reason. See id. at 62, 63, 64-65, 68, 
69-70, 94-95, 103, 109-10 (excusing Jurors Irwin, Pefia, Chambers, Stevens, Knickmeier, 
Anderson, and Erickson for cause). Although Defendant would naturally not have had 
any incentive to object to the dismissal of Jurors Irwin, Pena, Anderson, and Erickson 
because of possible sympathies to Merryweather, Defendant did not lodge any objection 
to the dismissal of Jurors Chambers, Stevens, or Knickmeier, who appeared to 
sympathize with Defendant, despite the fact that at least two of these jurors (Chambers 
and Stevens) gave answers remarkably similar to Juror Tarns' answers. Id. at 64-65, 68. 
Of all the jurors excused for cause, Defendant objected only to Juror Tarns' dis-
missal. Juror Tarns first raised his hand in response to a question regarding whether he or 
a member of his family had been "either a plaintiff or a defendant in a similar case." Id. 
at 69. Juror Tarns stated that "my daughter was a defendant, or is a defendant, in a pend-
ing traffic type of accident." Id. at 70. Later, Juror Tarns raised his hand again when 
asked about "any alleged lawsuit crisis or jury verdict crisis or controversy." Id. at 87. 
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Based on these two responses, Juror Tarns was called into chambers for further 
questioning out of the presence of the full jury panel. Counsel asked Juror Tarns "if 
you've drawn any conclusions or preconceived ideas or anything about that?" Juror 
Tarns responded by stating that "[t]here's a couple of things it goes back to. One is 
certainly with my daughter and the lawsuit she's in. That does put a little stress on it." 
Id. at 97.l6 Juror Tarns added that 
Also what I heard in the questioning was something about have you heard 
anything on this case. What I mean is about excessive awards of 
compensation. Some things that come to my mind are things like the 
spilled coffee and the award there. That does bother me a little bit. Of 
course, I don't know all the facts of the case, but it does bother me. 
Id. at 98. Counsel asked: "Other than your thoughts about what you have expressed 
today about your daughter and the McDonald's case, do you have any problem in assur-
ing is that you can be fair to both sides and be impartial?" Id. at 99. Juror Tarns replied: 
That's one of those things, where you have a daughter similarly involved, 
it's kind of emotional. I do have to say that I really think I could, but when 
you start to talk about those emotions, there's going to be something in the 
back of my mind. 
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, Juror Tarns was asked if he could "look at the facts and 
decide based on the facts that are presented and make a determination of what is fact and 
go from there." Id. at 100. Juror Tarns responded that "I think I can. It's kind of hard to 
say absolutely. I think I can." Id. (emphasis added). 
A few minutes later, the court stated that Juror Tams 
struggled significantly on several occasions indicating how much the issue 
with his daughter in New York weighs on his mind and how emotionally 
16
 Defendant states in his brief that Juror Tams raised a concern about "a hypothetical 
case involving a daughter." See Aplt's Br., at 47. This statement is false. The case 
involving Juror Tams' daughter was far from hypothetical—it was a real case involving a 
real accident that was "kind of emotional" for Juror Tams. Vol. 1, at 99. 
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attached he is to that. He believes he could set it aside. He really struggled 
in that answer and it appeared to the court that—we don't know any of the 
circumstances of that lawsuit, other than he very much empathized with his 
daughter and felt it was a tremendous issue for him and for her. 
Id. at 101-02 (emph. added). Upon this basis, the court excused Juror Tarns. Id. at 104. 
The district court's decision was entirely proper, and was certainly not an abuse of 
discretion. It has long been held, under Utah law, that a juror who raises issues as to his 
impartiality should be dismissed for cause. See. e.g., State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 
(Utah 1984) (holding that a juror who gave a "general and indefinite" response stating 
that he could be fair, but also stated that he would tend to give police officers, rather than 
defendants, "the benefit of the doubt," should have been removed for cause); Jenkins v. 
Pamsh, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981) (holding that a juror who indicated that she would 
favor the defendant-physician's testimony over that of the plaintiff should have been 
removed for cause, even though the juror expressed a desire and ability to remain 
impartial); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975)17 (holding that a 
juror who stated that she had strong feelings about anyone who would sue to recover 
money for the death of another should have been dismissed for cause, despite the fact that 
the juror stated that she could render a verdict free of bias). In each of these cases, the 
district court had refused to excuse the juror for cause, and in each of these cases it was 
held to be error for the district court not to have excused the jurors for cause. 
1 7 
These cases (Hewitt, Jenkins, and Crawford) all applied an "automatic reversal" rule, 
meaning that when a juror was improperly excused (or not excused) for cause, automatic 
reversal would result. The automatic reversal rule was abrogated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). However, neither Menzies nor any 
of its progeny have overruled Hewitt, Jenkins, or Crawford as regards those cases' 
holdings on the issues relevant here—that is, whether there was error at all (whether or 
not automatically reversible) in a trial judge's handling of for cause dismissals. 
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Thus, in this case, the district court made the right decision. Indeed, the opposite 
decision—refusing to excuse Juror Tarns for cause—may have been reversible error, 
given Juror Tarns' statements that he was "emotional" about his daughter's accident and 
that he was unsure whether he could render an unbiased verdict. Recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that 
[w]e emphasize again that trial judges should err on the side of caution in 
ruling on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial discretion 
accorded a trial judge must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all 
issues of bias can be dispensed by the simple expedient of replacing a 
questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to question. 
See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f51, 992 P.2d 951. The district court's decision to 
excuse Juror Tarns, and to replace him with another juror whose neutrality was not open 
to question, was the right decision.18 There was no abuse of discretion. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. ROLLINS 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony and 
Defendant argues that "Utah law requires trial courts to expend significant effort in 
rehabilitating a potential juror to whom even an inference of bias has attached," see 
Aplt's Br., at 48, and asserts that the district court failed to adequately attempt to 
rehabilitate Juror Tarns. While Defendant's statement of law is correct as far as it goes, 
the argument fails for two reasons. First, the district court did attempt to rehabilitate 
Juror Tarns. As discussed above, the court invited Juror Tarns back into chambers, 
outside the presence of the rest of the jury pool, for further questioning. The questioning 
of Juror Tams takes up at least portions of ten (10) pages of trial transcript. This is 
simply not a case where the trial court accepted, without further examination, the bald 
answer of a prospective juror that he could not be fair. Second, after the district court's 
further questioning of Juror Tams, a strong inference of bias remained, and in such a 
situation even the cases cited by Defendant require that a trial court dismiss the juror for 
cause. See State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that 
"[o]nce such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective juror may not sit, even if the 
prospective juror later asserts that he or she can render an impartial verdict") (citing 
cases), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 503 (Utah 1997). 
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report of Dr. Rollins. Defendant argues that the district court erroneously admitted Dr. 
Rollins' testimony, and that without Dr. Rollins' testimony, there is insufficient evidence 
to support the verdict. Defendant therefore asserts that the district court, after having 
excluded Dr. Rollins' testimony, should have granted Defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. This contorted argument fails for the simple reason that Dr. Rollins' testimony 
and life care plan is routine expert testimony, commonly admitted in Utah and other 
states, regarding an injured party's future expenses, and was properly admitted here. 
A. Dr. Rollins' Testimony Was Sufficiently Certain 
Defendant first argues that Dr. Rollins' testimony lacked certainty, because he did 
not testify that Merryweather would incur the enumerated future expenses to a "reason-
able certainty." Aplt's Br., at 41. Defendant argues, citing Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 
P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1965), that the proper standard of "certainty" for future medical 
expenses is not "based upon a reasonable medical probability" ("the BURMP Standard"), 
but, rather, the "reasonable certainty" standard as set forth in Robinson. 
1. The "reasonable certainty" standard is the same thing as the 
BURMP Standard. 
First, Defendant's argument is based on semantics. He argues that an expert's 
statement that damages will be incurred "based upon a reasonable medical probability" is 
not good enough; rather, he asserts that the expert must state that the future damages will 
be incurred to a "reasonable certainty." See Aplt's Br., at 41-42. Defendant is playing 
word games. Even Defendant's own cited case explains that damages, even future 
damages, may be proven with evidence that the damages are more probable than not: 
There must be a firm foundation for any award by proof that is at least 
more probable than not that the damage will be suffered. For this reason, 
the jury should not be allowed to assess future damages on probability, but 
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only such damages as it believes from the preponderance of the evidence 
the plaintiff will with reasonable certainty incur in the future. 
See Robinson, 409 P.2d at 125 (italics added). Justice Crockett, the author of the opinion 
in Robinson, explained that: 
The law does not and cannot require absolute certainty. If we can predict 
circumstances with reasonable certainty, that is a sufficient foundation 
upon which to base our plans and actions. The traditionally accepted test of 
the law is that a fact may be found if reasonable minds may believe it by a 
preponderance, or greater weight of the evidence. This means that if it can 
reasonably be believed that it is more probable than not, or that it will with 
reasonable certainty occur, a finding of such fact is justified. That is the 
test to apply in determining whether the evidence will support an award of 
future damages. 
Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 802, 807 (Utah 1957) 
(Crockett, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
In fact, Defendant's argument has been made once before in Utah, and has been 
soundly rejected. In Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G. R. Co., 218 P.2d 685 (Utah 1950), 
rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 233 P.2d 699 (Utah 1951), a personal injury case, the 
trial judge instructed the jury that "the plaintiff was entitled to recover for all pain and 
suffering that he 'will probably endure' in the future." Id. at 693. The defendant argued 
that this was error, and that the trial court should have instructed the jury that a plaintiff 
could only recover for "such future pain and suffering as the evidence established with 
'reasonable certainty.'" Id. The defendant's argument was rejected, and the Utah Sup-
reme Court upheld the instruction containing the language "will probably endure." Id. 
These authorities demonstrate that, whether phrased in terms of "reasonable 
certainty" or "based upon reasonable medical probability," the standard is the same— 
evidence of future damages is admissible if such future damage is more likely than not to 
occur (that it is a probability rather than a possibility). See Dalebout v. Union Pac. R. 
51572H1 30 
Co., 1999 UT App 151, 121 & n.2, 980 P.2d 1194 (noting the "confusing clutter of 
labels" that all amount to the same thing); Phillip E. Hassman, J.D., Annot.: 
Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony as to Future Consequences of Injury as 
Affected by Expression in Terms of Probability or Possibility, 75 A.L.R.3d 9, at § 2[a]. 
2. The district court properly instructed the jury. 
In this case, the district court properly applied these standards in instructing the 
jury. The Model Utah Jury Instructions regarding special damages state as follows: 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of 
medical [hospital and nursing] care, services and supplies reasonably 
required and actually given in the treatment of the plaintiff [and the 
reasonable value of similar items that more probably than not will be 
required and given in the future. 
MUJI § 27.3 (emphasis added). In discussions with the district court and counsel 
regarding jury instructions, Defendant's only objection to this instruction was that he 
wanted a clause regarding proximate cause tacked on to the end. See Vol. 6A, at 16. The 
trial court granted that request, and therefore the jury instruction that was actually given 
to the jury on this point reads as follows: 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of 
medical care, services and supplies reasonably required and actually given 
in the treatment of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar items 
that more probably than not will be required and given in the future, 
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. 
See R. at 697 (jury instruction #23) (emphasis added, portion requested by Defendant 
underscored). Defendant did not take exception to this instruction, as given, in any way. 
3. Dr. Rollins' testimony comports with this standard. 
Dr. Rollins' testimony comports with this standard and with the instruction given. 
As set forth above, at pages 6-7, Dr. Rollins' testimony was based upon Dr. Ashbum's 
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opinion, based upon a reasonable medical probability, that Merryweather would require 
certain medical treatment in the future. During his direct examination, Dr. Ashburn 
testified regarding each and every section of Dr. Rollins' report, concluding that each 
item listed would be required, based on a reasonable medical probability. See Vol. 4, at 
84-91, 94-98. Significantly, Defendant did not object to any of these conclusions. 
Dr. Rollins took the stand after Dr. Ashburn, and testified that, in essence, he had 
put a price (in year 1999 dollars for the northern Utah area) on the items that Dr. Ashburn 
had testified would be necessary to a reasonable medical probability. Vol. 5, at 98. Dr. 
Rollins stated that the amounts listed were based on reasonable medical/rehabilitative 
probabilities. Id. at 100-01. Dr. Randle then computed the present value, based on 
accepted economic principles, of the amounts testified to by Dr. Rollins. Id. at 200. 
Thus, there is evidence from three experts, including a medical doctor, to support 
the contention that Merryweather will, more probably than not, require specific types of 
future medical attention. There is nothing in Utah law that requires future damages to be 
proven to a greater degree of certainty that this. 
B* Dr. Rollins' Testimony Was Sufficiently Reliable 
Defendant next argues that Dr. Rollins' testimony was inadmissible because it was 
"based on novel scientific principles or techniques" and is therefore not sufficiently 
reliable under the principles set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). 
This argument is patently meritless for two reasons, First, Dr. Rollins' testimony 
regarding an injured person's life care plan is not "novel" or based on "unique" scientific 
principles, and therefore Rimmasch does not even apply. Second, even if Rimmasch did 
apply, Dr. Rollins' testimony is sufficiently reliable under even that heightened standard. 
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1. Dr. Rollins' testimony is not novel. 
Dr. Rollins' testimony is anything but novel. In essence, Dr. Rollins is asked to 
take medical diagnoses (made by physicians) regarding a patient's future medical needs 
(e.g., number of physician visits required, amount and type of medication required) and 
future employment prospects (e.g., full-time, part-time) and thereafter "cost-factor," or 
place a price tag on, those needed items in the relevant geographic region. Vol. 5, at 81. 
Dr. Rollins, and other rehabilitation experts, generate expert reports known as "life care 
plans" that set forth the amount of money required to keep up with a patient's future 
medical needs.19 In addition, Dr. Rollins and other rehabilitation experts also generate 
estimates of a plaintiffs future lost wages, based upon the amount of money a plaintiff 
makes before the injury as opposed to after its effects are felt. In this case, Dr. Rollins 
made no independent diagnoses of his own—he simply placed the diagnoses of medical 
doctors into economic terms, based upon his own research and interviews. 
This type of evidence is by no means "novel" or based on "novel" scientific 
techniques. Life care plans are generated in nearly all major personal injury cases, and in 
some cases are generated by both plaintiffs and defendants. The burden of proof based 
upon the existing law of damages in Utah requires plaintiffs to prove needs, injuries and 
damages based upon a reasonable medical probability. Cf R. at 693, 697 (jury 
instructions). A life care plan is imply the tool that allows this burden to be met, in 
19
 Dr. Rollins stated that he develops "life care plans which are road maps and guides for 
people with disabilities and handicaps as a result of illness, injury, or disease events in 
their life. And develop those with respect to identifying the unmet needs and the costs of 
those goods and services." Vol. 5, at 74. 
20
 Indeed, Dr. Rollins stated that he gave Dr. Ashburn "veto power" over his report 
respecting whether the medical services set forth therein were reasonable. Vol. 5, at 99. 
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association with physicians and economists, by providing geographical cost-factoring of 
probable future needs and expenses. Dr. Rollins himself has been qualified to offer his 
opinions in court in more than 13 states, and has been qualified as an expert to offer his 
opinions at least 6 times in the courts of the state of Utah. See Vol. 5, at 78. 
Moreover, rehabilitation experts are now so widespread and so well-recognized 
that they have their own board certification process. Dr. Rollins stated that he is "board 
certified as an expert in trauma and stress in a division known as rehabilitation trauma 
and stress," and as a "rehabilitation specialist with training in certification in stress and 
tension management." Id. at 77. Dr. Rollins further stated that he holds "board 
certification in forensic medicine, not for the purposes of practicing medicine but for 
developing life care plans and working with medical models." Id. 
In short, there can be "no plausible claim that the type of expert testimony which 
was offered . . . in the case was based upon novel scientific principles or techniques." 
Patey v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31,116, 977 P.2d 1193; see State V. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,119, 
1 P.3d 546; Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396 (the heightened standard applies only when the 
testimony is "based on newly discovered principles"). Where there can be no plausible 
argument that the expert's opinions are based on newly discovered principles, Rimmasch 
is not even implicated. Patey, 1999 UT 31,116, 977 P.2d 1193 (stating that the expert's 
testimony "did not even implicate Rimmasch, much less violate its requirements"). 
Where Rimmasch is not implicated, the standard for admissibility is set forth in 
Defendant asserts, without a citation to the record or to case law, that "[t]he science 
employed [by Dr. Rollins] was shown to be unique." See Aplt's Br., at 43. Defendant 
does not specify who showed it to be unique, or when and where this "showing" 
occurred. Of course, this is because there was never any such "showing." Dr. Rollins' 
testimony is not unique, or based on a novel science or newly discovered principles. 
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Utah R. Evid. 702—expert testimony is admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." See State v. Adams, 2000 UT 
42, f 17, 5 P.3d 642. In this case, the district court correctly determined that, for the 
reasons set forth above, Dr. Rollins had specialized knowledge that would assist the jury. 
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Rollins' testimony. 
2. Even under the Rimmasch standard, Dr. Rollins' testimony is 
reliable and admissible. 
Even assuming, however, that the heightened reliability standards of Rimmasch 
were applicable here, Dr. Rollins' testimony is sufficiently reliable to pass muster even 
under those standards. The first step in the three-step Rimmasch analysis is a determin-
ation as to "whether the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's 
testimony are inherently reliable." See State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996).22 
A court can do this by judicial notice "if the scientific principles and techniques at issue 
have been generally recognized and accepted by the legal and scientific communities." 
Id. There can be no question that placing a price tag on a medically-determined amount 
of future medical care and on future employment income, if "science" at all, is a 
methodology that has been fully accepted by the legal and scientific communities. 
Again, life care plans are used in the vast majority of significant personal injury cases, 
The three-step Rimmasch analysis is difficult to apply in this case because Dr. Rollins' 
testimony is neither novel nor based on newly discovered scientific principles. See supra 
Part IV.B.l. In addition, Defendant's 5-word objection ("Objection, your honor; 
foundation, Rimmasch," Vol. 5, at 95) did not cover any of this; in other words, Defen-
dant never asked the court to apply this three-step analysis to Dr. Rollins' testimony (and, 
incredibly, even Defendant's appellate brief does not contain any discussion of this three-
step analysis). Typically, Rimmasch/Daubert motions involve a request for the district 
court to conduct a complete gatekeeper hearing, out of the presence of the jury, and full 
inquiry into the expert testimony, including full briefing. Defendant did not take such ac-
tion, and therefore this Court has no Rimmasch findings from the district court to review. 
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often by both sides, and are an established method of estimating future damages. 
The second Rimmasch step involves a determination that "the scientific principles 
or techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by 
sufficiently qualified experts." Id. Here, Dr. Rollins testified that he got his prices from 
established medical texts (e.g., Medacode) and obtained further information by interview-
ing relevant people, such as Mr. Jex and Dr. Ashburn. There can be no question that Dr. 
Rollins properly applied pricing techniques in this case. 
The third and final step in the Rimmasch analysis involves a determination, under 
Utah R. Evid. 403, as to whether "the proffered evidence will be more probative than 
prejudicial." Id. Again, Defendant did not specifically ask the district court to make such 
a finding. See supra note 22. However, it should be obvious that placing pricing 
information into evidence is not prejudicial at all, and is probative of how much it will 
cost Merryweather for future medical care, etc. 
In short, Rimmasch does not apply here at all, because Dr. Rollins' testimony is 
not novel or based on newly discovered principles. Even if Rimmasch did somehow 
apply, Dr. Rollins' testimony is sufficiently reliable to meet even that standard. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. 
V, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING MR. JEX TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE DEMOTION 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. Jex to testify 
regarding the September 2000 demotion, and did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion for a new trial on this issue. 
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A. Defendant Deliberately Obfuscates and Confuses the Multiple Changes 
in Merryweather's Employment Status 
Defendant's entire argument on this point is premised on what appears to be a 
deliberate obfuscation of the facts. Defendant accuses Merryweather of "trial by 
ambush," but this claim loses its luster after an examination of the actual facts of the case. 
As explained in greater detail above, see pages 11-14, Merryweather's employment at 
BRVH underwent several changes, including two changes in the months immediately 
prior to trial. The following summary reflects Merryweather's actual employment: 
Until October 1997—full-time staff nurse, 40 hours per week. 
October 1997-March 1998—unable to work at all. 
• March 1998-March 1999—upon her return to work, and due to the pain she 
was suffering, she was unable to continue as a staff/floor nurse. She was 
given a new position completing administrative and ministerial tasks. This 
was a full-time position. 
• March 1999-Summer 2000—promotion to #3 administrator at BRVH. This 
was a full-time position. 
• Summer 2000-September 2000—due to physical difficulties that were 
affecting her job performance, and upon the advice of Dr. Ashburn, 
Merryweather reduced her hours from 40 to 32 per week, but remained 
employed as the #3 administrator at BRVH. 
• September 2000—after several meetings and repeated attempts to 
encourage and help Merryweather, Mr. Jex made the decision to demote her 
from her administrative position and return her to floor/staff nursing, where 
she would be asked to perform low-impact tasks dealing primarily with 
labor and delivery and the newborn nursery. 
It is entirely possible that Defendant and his counsel were, in the beginning, in good 
faith confused about the changes in Merryweather's employment status. However, after 
trial, new trial briefing, oral argument on the new trial motions, and the trial court's 
decision on the new trial motions, good faith confusion no longer seems plausible. See 
R. at 1135 (district court's new trial opinion clearly setting forth the distinction between 
the various changes in Merryweather's employment status). 
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Throughout this time period, Merryweather was being told by her physicians that, due to 
her pain, any attempt to return to work full-time would end in failure. R. at 927, 929-30. 
Defendant was fully aware of these findings and opinions, and, prior to trial, had been 
given (through discovery supplementations) documents evidencing each of these employ-
ment changes except the September 2000 demotion. See R. at 1135 (district court stating 
that "[t]here is no dispute that Plaintiff had, in a number of disclosures, indicated the 
Plaintiffs ongoing problems at her work"); Aplt's Br., at 22 ("Defendant was provided 
plaintiffs medical and employment records even after the discovery cut off in this case"). 
At the beginning of trial, Merryweather5 s counsel did not yet know of the 
September 2000 demotion. See R. at 804-13. The statements made by Merryweather's 
counsel during opening statement (cited in Aplt's Br, at 22-23, 24) were references to the 
summer 2000 cutback in hours, and not to the September 2000 demotion.24 The district 
court understood this. See R. at 1135. 
In short, there was no "ambush" here. Any accusations to the contrary are based 
on a deliberate obfuscation of the facts of this case. 
B. The District Court's Evidentiary Rulings on This Issue, On Balance, 
Were in Favor of Defendant 
When informed of the new employment developments, the district court made a 
series of evidentiary rulings. As discussed above, the court did allow Mr. Jex to state that 
Merryweather had been demoted because of her difficulties at work. However, the court 
refused to allow the admission of Dr. Randle's updated economic report, which took into 
24
 If "defense counsel had no idea what plaintiffs counsel was talking about" in opening 
statement, see Aplt's Br., at 23, that ignorance was not Merryweather's fault. There is no 
dispute that documents (e.g., medical and employment records) evidencing Merry-
weather's summer 2000 cutback in hours had been given to defense counsel before trial. 
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account the March 1999 promotion and the September 2000 demotion. Because of this 
ruling, the only economic evidence that actually went to the jury was Dr. Randle's 
previous 1999 report, which was based on pre-March 1999 employment information. 
While Merryweather was prevented from incorporating these recent developments 
into her economic analysis (which deprived her of the chance to present evidence of an 
additional $290,000.00 in future lost wages), Defendant was permitted to make full use of 
the March 1999 promotion and later employment developments in his cross-examination 
of Merryweather's experts, including Dr. Rollins and Dr. Randle. 
This set of evidentiary rulings by the district court was certainly not an abuse of 
discretion. If anything, Defendant came out ahead on the entire set of rulings. 
C. The District Court's Rulings Were Not an Abuse of Discretion 
Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
on this point. That motion was grounded in Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(3), which provides that 
"a new trial may be granted" on the basis of "[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against." In this case, the evidence of the demotion was 
not known to either party until September 25 (during trial), but should not have come as a 
surprise to anyone. The district court certainly did not abuse its discretion in handling 
Defendant argues that the evidence of the demotion undercut his "strong argument 
against [Merryweather's] claim for future lost wages." See Aplt's Br., at 19. However, 
any argument, no matter how "strong" it looks, is only as good as the facts supporting it. 
When those facts change, the argument's strength changes as well. Defendant had been 
repeatedly told, by medical experts, that Merryweather's attempt to maintain full-time 
employment would fail. That it finally did fail is a fact, and Defendant seeks to hide this 
fact from the jury in an attempt to prop up his "strong argument." Defendant and his 
counsel are certainly aware that the facts, in personal injury cases, are fluid right up to 
and even after trial, because such cases involve real injured people whose quest for 
proper medical treatment and level of employment does not begin or end with a trial. 
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this situation as it did, and in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
1. The demotion was hardly a surprise. 
As noted above, Defendant was on notice, through supplementations and 
depositions, that Merryweather was having problems at work, and that any attempt to 
maintain full-time employment was likely to end in failure. E.g., R. at 927, 929-30. 
Defendant and his counsel made the risky tactical decision to ignore this evidence, and to 
build a trial strategy around the argument that Merryweather was being paid more in the 
administrative position than as a staff nurse. Defendant's tactical decision backfired, and 
he is not entitled to another bite at the apple by pleading "surprise." 
2. Defendant could have uncovered further evidence of Merryweather's 
employment problems. 
Furthermore, Rule 59(a)(3) is only available to parties that have "utiliz[ed] . . . 
available discovery procedures." Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339, 341-42 (Utah 
1979). A party that sticks its head in the sand and fails to fully avail itself of the 
discovery process may not hide behind Rule 59(a)(3) when the facts at trial turn out to be 
different than previously assumed. In this case, Defendant did not: 
depose Mr. Jex, despite the fact that both Merryweather and Defendant had 
designated Mr. Jex as a possible witness, see R. at 94, 231; 
• depose anyone else at BRVH, or at BRVH's parent company, 
Intermountain Health Care; 
• depose Dr. Randle, the economist who would ultimately testify to the jury 
regarding Merryweather's wage loss; or 
• ask for a follow-up deposition of Merryweather in the 22 months prior to 
trial, despite having received documents indicating problems at work and 
the cutback in hours in the summer of 2000. 
Had Defendant bothered to take these depositions, he would have learned further facts re-
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garding Merryweather's problems at work, and would have been able to more fully probe 
the likelihood of a demotion in the face of the summer 2000 reduction in hours worked. 
Defendant, however, took none of these actions. Rather, as soon as Defendant hit 
upon the "strong argument" based on the higher pay, he more or less ceased efforts to 
discover additional related information. In such a situation, Defendant cannot be said to 
have been unfairly surprised by the September 2000 demotion. 
This is especially true in this case, where the district court carefully considered 
what to do about this piece of evidence, and issued a series of evidentiary rulings which, 
on balance, benefited Defendant more than Merryweather. In such an instance, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the situation the way it did, or in 
denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on that point. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
MANNER IN WHICH IT HANDLED ISSUES RELATING TO 
COMMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL 
Finally, Defendant complains of certain statements made by Merryweather's 
counsel at various points in the trial proceedings, and asserts that these statements were 
"inflammatory" and "prejudicial" and entitle Defendant to a new trial. This desperate 
20
 Defendant's citation to Royalty Petroleum Co. v. Arkla, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 674 (W.D. 
Okla. 1990), cannot save his argument. First, the Arkla case had nothing to do with Rule 
59(a)(3)—indeed, the movant in that case was not even seeking a new trial. The court 
was simply not deciding the same issues presented here. Second, the evidence allegedly 
kept until the last minute in Arkla was a document that had been in Arkla's files all along, 
but which it did not disclose until the eve of trial. In this case, by contrast, Merryweather 
properly supplemented her discovery responses. Third, the court in Arkla specifically 
found that, in the absence of the supplemental information, plaintiff "had no expectation" 
that any such evidence would be introduced. In this case, by contrast, Defendant had 
every reason to expect evidence of Merryweather's problems at work, and of the likely 
failure of her efforts to work full-time, based on the information already disclosed. The 
Arkla case simply has no bearing on this one. 
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argument is without merit; the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these 
statements to be uttered or in denying (1) Defendant's motion for a mistrial at the 
conclusion of Merryweather's opening statement or (2) Defendant's motion for a new 
trial based on these statements. 
A, Statements Made During Opening Statement 
Defendant takes issue with counsel's "fire" metaphor, and counsel's inference that 
the party who started the "fire" is the party accountable to pay for the damage caused by 
the "fire." See supra pages 16-17. Defendant characterizes this metaphor as an improper 
"plea to poverty" that, he asserts, inflamed the passions of the jury and caused them to 
issue an excessive verdict. This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, Defendant did not lodge a timely objection to these statements. At the time 
the statements were made, Defendant said nothing. See Vol. 1, at 152-53. Rather, 
Defendant waited until the conclusion of counsel's argument, and at that point moved for 
a mistrial. Id. at 169. When that motion was denied, Defendant did not move for a 
curative instruction, or seek any other remedy whatsoever. 
Second, the statements made by counsel were not an inflammatory "plea to 
poverty." Rather, these statements were part of a simple metaphor on the subject of 
In fact, a complete review of this portion of the trial transcript indicates that the real 
intent and focus of Defendant's motion for a mistrial was to circumvent the collateral 
source rule and seek the court's permission to allow a full discussion of health insurance 
benefits. Vol. 1, at 169-77. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, and cautioned 
Defendant regarding the insurance issue, stating that "we don't go there and I'm 
admonishing [both counsel] not to go there." Id. at 175. Defense counsel promised to 
"stay away from" the insurance issue, id. at 177, but, later, asked Ms. Frandsen if she 
"understood that [Merryweather] had benefits that could pay for those treatments." Vol. 
2, at 173 (emphasis added). Merryweather objected, and was sustained by the court. Id. 
Defendant continues this "benefits" effort in his brief. Aplt's Br., at 38-39 & n.6. 
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accountability. Defendant argues that u[w]ith fault admitted, 'accountability' is 
irrelevant." See Aplt's Br., at 35. However, Defendant neglects to mention that, while 
he had admitted liability, he was strenuously defending the case on causation grounds. 
See Aplt's Br., at 4 (stating that "the medical issues surrounding causation . . . were hotly 
contested"). Under these circumstances, a discussion of accountability and the basic 
T O 
elements of a tort claim is entirely appropriate. It is not a "plea to poverty." See R. at 
1136 (district court's statement that these remarks "when taken in context, would not 
have caused the jury to perceive impecuniosity"). 
B, Statements Made During the Trial 
Next, Defendant takes issue with certain statements of counsel during the trial. 
These statements were all innocuous side comments that either (1) were not objected to, 
or (2) were objected to and the objection was sustained. The court could not possibly 
have erred, because with respect to these comments it gave Defendant all it asked for. 
Mr. Knight. During counsel's cross-examination of Newell Knight, counsel 
asked Mr. Knight how much work he does for defendants. Mr. Knight stated that "as you 
well know, I do much more defense work." Vol. 6, at 166 (emphasis added). Counsel 
stated briefly "I do know." Id. at 167. Defendant objected, and the objection was 
sustained. Merryweather, quite frankly, does not understand how the trial court, from 
Defendant's perspective, could have erred here. It gave Defendant what he asked for. 
Indeed, counsel nowhere suggested that Merryweather was unable to pay for the 
medical treatment resulting from the accident; rather, counsel suggested simply that 
Merryweather shouldn't have to pay for it, since she didn't start the "fire." For these 
reasons, the case law cited by Defendant is entirely inapplicable—in each of those cases, 
the statement reflected a party's ability (or inability) to pay. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Brant, 
421 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1966) (statement that the amount demanded would send his 
client into a home for the indigent). 
515721vl 43 
Dr. Weight. During counsel's cross-examination of Dr. David Weight, Dr. 
Weight stated to counsel that "you had instructed [a friend of Merryweather's] not to talk 
to me." Id. at 231. In response, counsel stated "[t]hat's correct." Id. Defendant 
objected, and the objection was sustained. Id. 
Later during that same cross-examination, counsel stated to the witness that "it's 
my job to get to the bottom of—of your opinions and see if they hold any water." Id. at 
242. Again, Defendant objected, and the objection was sustained. Id. Merryweather, 
quite frankly, does not understand how the trial court, from Defendant's perspective, 
could have erred with respect to these statements made during the cross-examination of 
Dr. Weight. It gave Defendant everything he asked for. 
Dr. Knorpp. During counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Knorpp, counsel noticed 
that Dr. Knorpp was wearing a suit remarkably similar to the one counsel himself was 
wearing. Counsel remarked "[tjhat's a nice looking suit today." See Vol. 7, at 18. 
Defendant did not object to this statement; rather, defense counsel asked "[i]s that a 
question?" Id. The court instructed counsel to "proceed." Id. 
There is no way that any of these statements were harmful or prejudicial. In any 
event, Defendant got everything he asked for by way of relief from the district court 
related to these statements. There is no error here. 
C. Statements Made During Closing Argument 
Finally, Defendant takes issue with certain statements by counsel during closing 
argument. Again, as with the other statements, these statements were either (1) not 
objected to or (2) were remedied with a sustained objection. It is well-settled under Utah 
law that "[cjounsel for both sides have considerable latitude" during closing argument, 
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including "the right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the infer-
ences and deductions arising therefrom." See State v. Laffertv, 2001 UT 19, ^ [92, 20 P3d 
342. The statements made were within counsel's wide latitude, and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion (or commit plain error) by allowing these statements to be uttered. 
1. Statements regarding defense counsel's failure to provide 
documents to expert witnesses. 
Most of the statements with which Defendant now takes issue deal with the same 
topic—defense counsel's failure to provide Defendant's expert witnesses with infor-
mation pertinent to the opinion rendered by the expert. Defendant lists these statements 
in his brief, Aplt's Br., at 29-30, and characterizes them as "attacks on opposing coun-
sel," id. at 29. These statements are not attacks on counsel; rather, they are appropriate 
comments regarding the foundation of the testimony of Defendant's expert witnesses.29 
As explained above, at pages 8 & 10 n.3, defense counsel made a practice in this 
case of providing Defendant's experts with only selected documents. As noted, 
Merryweather made the district court aware of this practice prior to trial, when she filed a 
motion in limine. During cross-examination of Defendant's experts, Merryweather's 
counsel asked numerous questions of them regarding the information upon which they 
had based their opinions. Vol. 6, at 230-32 (Dr. Weight); Vol. 7, at 31-33 (Dr. Knorpp), 
112-16 (Dr. France). These experts all testified that they had been given only selected 
documents, and that their opinions were based upon the documents they had seen and the 
information they had been given. Id. 
It is important to note that these remarks were made in the context of noting the jury's 
responsibility as judges of the weight of the evidence, credibility of the witnesses, and 
judges of the facts of the case. Vol. 8, at 11 (discussing jury instruction #5). 
SlS^Hl 45 
During closing argument, counsel pointed out to the jury that these experts had not 
been given complete sets of information. For instance, Dr. France was not told, at the 
time he issued his opinion, that Defendant had testified that he had been traveling at 25 
miles per hour. Vol. 7, at 140. Counsel commented on this at closing argument, as a way 
of impugning the foundation of Defendant's expert testimony and opinions. 
These statements were entirely proper. It is certainly permissible to ask an expert 
witness what documents he has seen, and then to comment to the jury about it when the 
expert testifies that he has not seen critical documents. 
In any event, Defendant did not object to any of these statements. See Vol. 8, at 
13, 86-89. Therefore, the district court's decision to let them stand must be reviewed 
under the plain error standard. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d). It is apparent that the district 
court did not commit plain error in the admission of these statements. 
2. Statements regarding the fees received by Defendant's experts. 
Next, Defendant takes issue with counsel's statement to the jury during closing 
argument that Defendant's expert witnesses do most of their work for defendants (and not 
for plaintiffs), and each receive over $100,000 per year testifying for defendants and 
defense counsel. Such statements are entirely proper. "Fee arrangements may bear on 
the impartiality and, therefore, the credibility of an expert witness. Hence, an expert 
The case law Defendant cites in support of his argument is completely inapposite. 
Those cases prohibit statements "not justified by the record" and "without supporting 
evidence," see, e ^ , Missouri K.T.R. Co. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1951), 
and statements made "for the apparent purpose of inflaming the jury," see State v. 
Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 529 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Counsel's statements were 
entirely supported by the record, were the previous subject of a motion in limine, and 
were made to point out weaknesses in Defendant's expert testimony, not to inflame the 
jury. It would be hard to imagine a rule that prevented counsel from commenting on the 
foundation (or lack thereof) for the other side's expert testimony. 
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witness's fee is a proper subject on which to comment to the jury." See Burke v. State, 
484 A.2d 490, 499 (Del. 1984); see also Guzeldere v. Wallin, 593 N.E.2d 629, 637-38 
(111. Ct. App. 1992); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). Indeed, a 
statement that an expert is "a hired gun" who "does 90 percent of his work for plaintiffs" 
was deemed an admissible statement that "did not exceed the bounds of zealous argu-
ment." Dawson v. MetroHealth Or., 662 N.E.2d 1123, 1124-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).31 
These statements, fully supported by the evidence, e^g., Vol. 6, at 219-24 (Dr. 
Weight); Vol. 7, at 34-36 (Dr. Knorpp), were made without objection from Defendant. 
Vol. 8, at 92. The district court did not commit plain error by allowing these statements. 
3. Statements regarding counsel's opinions. 
Finally, Defendant takes issue with several statements made during closing argu-
ment that Defendant now characterizes as "personal opinions of plaintiffs counsel." 
Aplt's Br., at 31-32, 34. First, Defendant argues that counsel "personally opined as to 
what [Defendant's] testimony would have been had he been present." Id. at 31. This 
statement is so specious as to warrant only a brief response: Merryweather read Defen-
dant's deposition transcript into the record. Vol. 2, at 5-42. Counsel's argument regard-
ing Defendant's testimony was not opinion; it was a reference to actual record evidence. 
Second, Defendant takes issue with one other statement (and the only one he 
objected to at the time): counsel's statement that "I don't like these guys." Vol. 8, at 95. 
31
 The cases cited by Defendant do not advance his argument. Those cases involved 
situations where there was no evidence in the record as to how much the experts had been 
paid. See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Mass. 1978). The court 
found error because the prosecutor's remarks "were based on facts not in evidence." Id. 
In this case, by contrast, Defendant's experts had already testified that they did 85% to 
90% of their work for defendants, and that they made roughly $100,000.00 per year 
testifying. See, e ^ , Vol. 6, at 219-24 (Dr. Weight); Vol. 7, at 34-36 (Dr. Knorpp). 
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Defendant objected, and the court called for a sidebar conference. Id. After the sidebar, 
and after agreeing to do so with the court, Merryweather's counsel instructed the jury to 
"disregard my personal feelings and my history with these guys." Id. Defendant did not 
request further relief, such as an additional curative instruction or some other remedy/2 
The court did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it handled that situation/3 
In short, the district court simply did not abuse its discretion in handling the 
allegedly "prejudicial" statements of counsel. Most of these statements were made 
without objection, and where an objection was lodged, it was granted and the statement 
remedied. There is simply no error here. 
VII. IF THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR, ANY SUCH ERROR 
WAS HARMLESS 
As discussed above, the district court did not commit error, and did not abuse its 
discretion, in its evidentiary rulings during the trial. However, even if one were to ass-
ume, arguendo, that the court committed error in this case, any such error was harmless. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61 states that 
[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
J
 Defendant appears to suggest, in his brief, that counsel's statements violated the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Aplt's Br., at 31. If Defendant or defense counsel feels 
that this is the case, and that any such violation was not cured by the instruction given 
after the sidebar conference, their remedy is to file a complaint with the Utah State Bar. 
Defendant also argues that counsel's statement that "[i]t makes me crazy" was an 
improper and prejudicial statement of opinion. Aplt's Br., at 30-31. As discussed above, 
this statement was made in the context of discussing defense counsel's practice of giving 
Defendant's experts only selected information. Id. at 30. It is proper to comment on the 
foundation for an opposing expert's testimony. Again, however, Defendant did not 
object to this statement, Vol. 8, at 87, and its admission was not plain error. 
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the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
Substantial justice is affected "if, viewing the evidence as a whole, there is a reasonable 
likelihood a different result would have been reached absent the error." Erickson v. 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) ("an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our confidence in the verdict"). 
In this case, any error committed by the district court (if any) was harmless. As 
argued above, none of the decisions made by the district court during the course of the 
trial were abuses of the district court's wide discretion. Even assuming, however, that 
one or more of them were, any such error was harmless because the likelihood that the 
jury would have reached a different outcome in the absence of any error is so low that 
confidence in the jury's verdict should not be undermined. 
A key inquiry in the harmless error analysis is whether there would have been 
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict even without erroneously admitted evi-
dence. E^g., State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, |23, 5 P.3d 642 (holding that the erroneous 
admission of certain testimony was harmless because "other persuasive evidence sup-
ports" the verdict). In this case, even if, for instance, Mr. Cottle had not been allowed to 
present 5 minutes of rebuttal, or if the trial court had informed the jury from the 
beginning as to Defendant's church service overseas, or if Merryweather's counsel had 
not made any "accountability" reference in opening statement, the jury's verdict would 
not have been any different. The court, after careful scrutiny, determined that "there was 
evidence presented to the jury that supports the verdict." See R. at 1137. This would still 
be true even if one or more of the district court's evidentiary rulings had been different. 
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In short, there is no basis for assuming that the jury's verdict would have been any 
different had one or more of the rulings come out the other way. The jury spent eight 
days of their lives considering the evidence presented, and rendered a verdict wholly 
supported by the evidence presented. The district court, after two rounds of briefing and 
admittedly careful scrutiny, concluded that the jury's verdict was sound. There is no 
reason for this Court's confidence in the jury's verdict to be undermined in any way. If 
the district court committed error, that error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental issue in this case is, as the district court found, that "there was 
evidence presented to the jury that supports the verdict." R. at 1137. The jury sat for 
eight days, heard the testimony, weighed the evidence, and rendered a verdict based on 
that evidence. The district court, "[ajfter considerable reflection" during the new trial 
motion, and after a diligent "search[] for evidence of passion and prejudice," and even 
after stating that it "would not hesitate to grant a new trial if it could, in good conscience, 
say that there was a part of the verdict that did not have evidentiary support," upheld the 
jury's verdict. Id. Neither this ruling, nor any of the district court's other rulings, 
constituted an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this _7 day of December, 2001. 
By / ^ - ^ 
Ryan M/Harris 
JONE^f WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Lynn C. Harris 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rhonda Merryweather 
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(Proceedings to this point not transcribed.) 
MR. IVIE: Let's switch quickly to the issue of the 
rebuttal witness. The last witness the jury heard was the 
plaintiff1s friend from the hospital, Jeff Cottle. He was 
called as a rebuttal witness by the plaintiff. 
The sole purpose for his testimony was to leave the jury 
with the impression that the defendant's medical witness was 
a liar. That was very simply it. Mr. Cottle was not asked 
one question to refute testimony given by the witness in the 
defendant's case in chief. It is clear from the case law 
that this is nothing but a strong man argument that is not 
what rebuttal is for. You don't call a rebuttal witness to 
rebut evidence that you yourself put on. Rebuttal is to 
refute the opponent's testimony, not testimony which a party 
himself elicits. 
We cited to Randall versus Allen which defined rebuttal 
evidence as evidence tending to refute, modify, explain or 
otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's 
evidence. The opponent's evidence-
We cited Astle versus Clark, which provided that the 
purpose of rebuttal evidence is not merely to contradict or 
corroborate evidence already presented, but to respond to new 
points of evidence first introduced by the opposing party. 
By the opposing party. 
We also cited to a Tenth Circuit decision which I think 
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was particularly on point. There, in Kotch Industries, Kotch 
versus Kotch Industries, they stated, "Further, even if 
1 Markel had disputed Hall!s testimony, the plaintiff's 
attorney intentionally elicited such testimony." Just as 
Harris did in his cross-examination of Dr. Knorpp. "When 
attorney conducting cross-examination affirmatively draws 
specific testimony, as occurred here, the district court 
not abuse its discretion by disallowing rebuttal to that 
testimony." 
Well, in light of the clear law on the issue, the 
plaintiff retreats to an argument that he was refuting 
1 evidence presented in our case in chief, because in the 
report of Dr. Knorpp, which is offered in evidence, there 
a single comment. It's not commented on in his oral 
J testimony, but it is in the report, that he did have a 
conversation with Mr, Cottle. 
Mr. 
an 
out 
does 
is 
J Well, was it proper rebuttal because that was in there? 
Of course not. If he was to rebut that statement, he wou 
call a witness to say no, I didn't have a conversation wi 
Dr. Knorpp. He didn't talk about the content of the 
conversation in that report. Nothing of the questioning 
the rebuttal intended to go to that limited comment. It 
was intended to go to evidence which Mr. Harris elicited 
himself and in what really was an attempt of character 
assassination on Dr. Knorpp. That is not the type of use 
Id 
th 
in 
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j . t / 1 0 / u i 11 : ia ri\\ HOO / J I 4oiu I S L i / iai ut-tsKHjttAn t i n l£|U08/007 
Page 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 proper rebuttal testimony. 
Finally, we would indicate that this type of extrinsic 
evidence is improper impeachment under Rule 608 of the Rules 
of Evidence. Subsection 
J conduct of a witness for 
supporting the witness's 
B states, "Specific instances of the 
the purpose of attacking or 
credibility, other than conviction 
I of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence." So not only was it improper rebuttal, 
but it should not have been used to impeach Dr. Knorpp 
because it was extrinsic 
THE COURT: Let 
evidence. 
me ask you on that same rule, going 
down to subsection C, though, isn't it certainly possible to 
argue that if Dr. Knorpp in fact had made the statements that 
were claimed, that that shows bias or prejudice on the part 
of the witness? 
MR. IVIE: Yes, I think that could be argued, Your 
Honor. But the fact remains that it was evidence that he J 
himself elicited, the plaintiff. So I do maintain that it's 
improper rebuttal. 
Going to the final point, the improper statements of 1 
counsel. 
(Hearing continued, not transcribed.) 
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